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ADR-0005: Preserve Cheat Engine write semantics

  • Status: Accepted
  • Date: 2026-10-21
  • Supersedes: none
  • Superseded by: none

Context

Many agent tools default to read-only or require per-operation confirmation. Cheat Engine does not. Once a process is opened, Cheat Engine allows reading and writing memory, changing protections, patching code and running scripts. That is the behavior users expect.

The project could add a safety layer, but a different default would:

  • break common Cheat Engine workflows;
  • make tools behave differently from the application they wrap;
  • create a false sense of safety, because lua_eval can write anyway;
  • add friction to every experiment.

Decision

ce-mcp preserves Cheat Engine semantics.

  • process_open is the consent boundary. After it succeeds, memory writes, protection changes and code patches are allowed.
  • There is no read-only mode by default.
  • Tools declare a risk class (read, write, execute, debug, ui) for documentation and optional policy.
  • An opt-in --safe mode may reject write and execute tools. It is not the default and does not sandbox Lua.
  • An opt-in audit log records tool calls, arguments and results. It is off by default.
  • The project never claims to make Cheat Engine safe. It documents the risks.

Consequences

Positive

  • Behavior matches Cheat Engine.
  • Existing workflows and scripts transfer directly.
  • No surprising failures when an agent tries to edit a value.
  • The risk model is honest: lua_eval is arbitrary execution by design.

Negative

  • An agent can corrupt a target process.
  • A prompt-injected agent could write to the wrong process.
  • Users may expect the tool to protect them and be surprised.
  • The optional safe mode can create a false sense of security.

Neutral

  • The audit log is an observability feature, not a security boundary.
  • Risk classes are metadata; clients may use them for their own approvals.

Alternatives considered

  1. Read-only by default. Rejected: diverges from Cheat Engine, blocks the main use case and is bypassable through Lua.
  2. Confirm every write. Rejected: there is no reliable GUI confirmation channel in a headless MCP server; it would break automation.
  3. No write tools at all. Rejected: fails the product goal.
  4. Sandbox Lua. Rejected: Cheat Engine’s API is the product; a sandbox would break compatibility and still leave memory writes.

References